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Several studies surprisingly associate higher taxes with smaller informal economy. To
account for this phenomenon we build a simple model of optimal taxation and argue
that this can be explained by dierences in public trust for governments. In equilibrium,
if producers' trust in the government is lower (higher), the government announces a
lower (higher) tax rate on the formal sector, but more (less) producers chose to stay
in the informal economy. Finally, using panel data estimation techniques we provide
empirical support for our theory.
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1INTRODUCTION
A common result in models dealing with an informal sector is a positive relationship
between the level of tax rates and the size of the informal sector. A non-exhaustive list of
the papers in this literature include Rauch (1991), Loayza (1996), Fortin et. al. (1997),
Ihrig and Moe (2004), Busato and Chiarini (2004), Amaral and Quintin (2006) and more
recently Delipalla (2009). Treating taxes as exogenous and letting the informal sector not
pay any taxes (or to pay only a fraction of those paid by the formal sector), this result is
immediate in a two-sector (formal and informal) neoclassical growth model where the role
of the government is passive.
The problem with the theoretical result described above is that it is not supported by
recent comprehensive empirical studies. Even though earlier empirical studies, using either
rm-level or macro data of limited size on the informal economy such as Frey and Pom-
merehne (1984), Schneider (1994,1997), Tanzi (1999), Davis and Henrekson (2004) where
taxes are left out to play an exogenous role, provided support for a positive correlation be-
tween taxes and informal sector size, several recent cross-section and panel data empirical
studies, using considerably larger datasets and allowing for the possible endogeneity of taxes,
associate higher taxes with a smaller size of the informal economy. Examples are Johnson
et. al. (1997), Johnson et. al. (1998), Friedman et. al. (2000), and Torgler and Schneider
(2007).1 Plotting informal sector size vs. tax burden2, corporate tax rate, average labor in-
come tax rate, or top marginal income tax rate in a cross-section clearly indicates a negative
relationship between these variables. In particular, Figure 1 shows the relationship between
the size of the informal sector and the tax burden. Moreover, the above mentioned studies
show that this negative empirical relationship remains signicant even after controlling for
several variables. Additionally, on the theoretical side, Aruoba (2010), Hatipoglu and Ozbek
(2011), and Elgin (2011) are among the exceptions, that by endogenizing taxes have the
potential to account for the negative correlation between taxes and informality.
PUT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE
In this paper, to contribute to this latter stream of literature, we develop a simple model
of optimal taxation and argue that the negative correlation between tax rates and the size
of the informal sector can be explained by dierences in public trust for governments. In
our model, given a tax rate set by the government, producers choose whether to operate in
the informal sector and not to pay any taxes or to stay in the formal sector, gaining access
to capital markets, but facing government scrutiny and paying taxes. Given the producers'
optimal behavior, the government chooses the tax rate to maximize its expected tax rev-
enue. The key friction we introduce in the model is that producers do not fully trust the
government's policy announcement and believe that it might expropriate formal producers'
output. In equilibrium, if producers' trust in the government is lower (higher), the govern-
ment announces a lower (higher) tax rate on the formal sector, but more (less) producers
1Friedman et. al. (2000) provides an excellent account of the literature on the relationship between taxes
and informality.
2Tax burden is dened as the ratio of the total tax revenue to GDP. Sources of this data will be made
clear in the empirical section of the paper.
2chose to stay in the informal economy. Finally, using dynamic panel estimation techniques,
we present empirical evidence that our theory is consistent with the data. Specically, we
show that once certain institutional and political risk variables we use to proxy public trust
are controlled for, the data indicates a positive correlation between the tax rate and the size
of the informal economy.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Next section describes the model economy.
Then, we present simulations of the model economy numerically characterizing the model. In
this section we also compare the model against the data. Then, in section four we conduct
a panel data econometric analysis which supports the hypotheses implied by the model.
Finally, we provide concluding remarks.
A SIMPLE MODEL
We assume that there are two kinds of agents in the economy, a continuum [0;1] of
household-producers, each denoted by i, and a government.
We assume household-producers (shortly households) have access to two production tech-
nologies which allow them to produce output. In turn, each household obtains utility from
the resulting prots; this is,
U(i)[(i)] = Eu[(i)]; i 2 [0;1] (1)
where E is the expected value operator, u() is a strictly increasing, concave, and twice
continuously dierentiable function, and (i) represent household i's prots.3
All households have identical preferences and are endowed with one unit of time, which
they can only use for labor. We also assume that each household draws a productivity
parameter (i) from some known distribution . Then the household decides on which
technology to use, in other words choses in which sector to supply it's labor input N(i) = 1.
The production technologies, here denoted formal and informal, are explained below as
follows:
Formal technology The rst production technology combines each household's capital






 ; i 2 [0;1]
where (i) is household i's productivity parameter,  2 (0;1), and where we dene z(i) :=
exp[(i)]. (The value of  is the same for all households.) As mentioned above, households
can provide labor but have no capital: They need credit to produce their optimal level of
output. We further assume that the only way that households can access the credit market
is if they decide to become part of the formal sector. It is a simple matter to verify that a
formal household's expected prots EF(i) are given by the following:
3In what follows, we will assume linear utility for simplicity, i. e. u[(i)] = (i).
4To keep the model as simple as possible we assume that households have access to as much capital they
want to employ in the production at some exogenous rate r
3EF(i) = YF(i)   rK(i)   ET(i); i 2 [0;1] (2)
where ET(i) are the household's expected tax payments.
Informal technology The second production technology consists of a labor-exclusive pro-
cess which provides output to obtain utility above a minimum subsistence level u0. We think
of this as a residual technology, in the sense that households that decide to go to the informal
sector are obliged to use this technology (given their inability to get capital). We assume
this technology takes the following functional form:
YI(i) = exp[(i)][Ni] = z(i); i 2 [0;1]:
Consequently, prots for an informal household are given by
I(i) = YI(i); i 2 [0;1]: (3)
In this sense, a household's decision is simple: Become a part of the formal sector or a
part of the informal sector. Households that choose to go to the formal sector are required
to pay a rent for the used capital (here assumed to be some exogenous value r dictated by
an authority external to the model, like a central bank) and are required to pay taxes. On
the other hand, households in the informal sector are not subject to government taxation
but also don't have access to capital.




fEu[F(i)];u[I(i)]g; i 2 [0;1]: (4)
Now we turn to the second agent of our model economy, the government.
The Government
There is a government in the model that wishes to maximize its tax revenues R. We
assume that the government announces a plan to charge formal households a percentage 
of their output.5
Households that decide to become a part of the formal sector have to turn in all relevant
asset and output information to the government; a household loses all possibility of hiding
any outcome from the government. 6 Furthermore, we assume here that households form an
expectation over the government's announced tax schedule. With some probability , they
believe that the government will commit to its announcement and impose the announced
rate . However, with some probability, 1   , there is a risk of expropriation. 7 For a
household in the formal sector, expected tax payments ET(i) take the form
5We have also performed the same calculations for the case of a proportional tax on prots; since the
qualitative and quantitative results are not changed, we use the proportional tax over output throughout
the document. These alternative simulations can be obtained from the authors upon request.
6One can also interpret this that in exchange, the government extends a\quality seal"that allows house-
holds to access the credit market.
7Here, we interpret  to some extent as a proxy variable for public trust depending on institutional quality
and government commitment.
4ET(i) = [ + (1   )]z(i)[K(i)]
 ; (5)
where  is the originally-announced taxation plan of the government.











where V is the potential threshold where households having a productivity above it chose
to operate in the formal sector, thereby constituting the tax base of the government.
The timing of the static game is as follows: First, households receive their productivity
parameter (i) 2 . Next, the government announces the tax rate it is supposed to charge
on formal output, . Households observe the government's decision and, contingent on
their productivity parameter (i) and their beliefs over the government's commitment to ,
E(), decide to go formal or informal. Formal agents access the credit market, obtain their
optimal level of K(i) and produce. The government observes all formal agents and their
output; then, it taxes according to the original plan, . Households get utility U(i)[(i)]
and informal households' prots are given by (3). The government consumes the value of
the tax revenue which results after solving (6).
Given the description of the model above, now we can dene the competitive equilibrium.
Denition 1: A competitive equilibrium of the above dened environment is given by
the tax rate , K(i), YI(i) and YF(i) for all i 2 [0;1] such that given , r, and ; K(i), YI(i)
and YF(i) solve the household producers' problem dened by (4) for all i 2 [0;1].
In the competitive equilibrium, only households above some threshold level of productiv-
ity choose to stay in the formal sector. This result is stated in the proposition below:
Proposition 1: Taking  as given, a household i with a productivity parameter (i) operates


















Proof. Consider any household i with productivity parameter (i). If the household decides
to go to the formal sector, its prots are given by (2) above. In that case the rst-order








Using the above equation in (7), and recalling that the household solves (4), it follows that
a household is indierent between operating in the formal or the informal sector if and only
8Our results are not sensitive to whether the government also forms an expectation over the two possible
outcomes or not.








Apply the log function to the equation above and rearrange to get the desired result.
Notice that, since we assume the existence of a unit measure of households, we can
interpret V(i) as a proxy for the size of the informal sector.9
Moreover, a straightforward application of Proposition 1 is presented in Corollary 1.
Corollary 1: If the government decides to reduce taxes , or if the exogenous authority (for
example the central bank) decides to decrease the interest rate r, or if there is an increase
in the public trust in the government, the size of the formal sector increases.




































Here we should note that, taking taxes exogenously given, we still have a positive corre-
lation between the level of taxes and the size of the informal sector. Keeping the discussion
we made in the introduction in mind this is not surprising. Our next task is to endogenize
the determination of taxes.
Subgame-perfect Equilibrium
Remark 1: Using the backward solution algorithm, given the announced  and , the
value of V can be obtained from equation (8). The government can also calculate this cuto












subject to  2 [0;1]:
Denition 2: A subgame-perfect equilibrium of the above dened environment is given
by the tax rate , K(i), YI(i) and YF(i) for i 2 [0;1] such that given r, and ;
9Notice that the actual size of the informal sector as percentage of formal output is given by the following





61.  solves the government's problem dened by (9).
2. For every possible  2 [0;1]; , K(i), YI(i) and YF(i) for i 2 [0;1] constitute a com-
petitive equilibrium.
Noticing that the informal sector size, V(i) and the tax rate, , are both endogenously
determined in the model; specically, we want to obtain comparative static results with
respect to . Unfortunately, the above dened government maximization problem does not
allow us to obtain analytical results. However, it is straightforward to numerically simulate
the model economy and characterize it through numerical simulations.
NUMERICAL RESULTS
We perform a set of numerical simulations to get a avor of the implications of Proposition
1 and Corollary 1. 10
Cuto Productivity and Tax Revenue with Variable Taxes
We are rst interested in determining how the cuto productivity value V and the
government's tax revenue R are aected by varying the value of taxes , for a given value
of . To do this, we create a grid (of step size 0.01) and we allow  to move in the interval
[0:01;0:99], xing the value of  at 0.75.11 We perform 1,000 repetitions and obtain the
average values for V and R. Figure 2 below shows the results of this simulation.
PUT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE
From Figure 2 we observe that, keeping the level of public trust constant, tax receipts show a
Laer eect and the total revenue of the government is maximized when  = 0:29. (For our
simulation, R0 = 0 for   0:49 because all households become informal after this point.)
In addition, and as claimed by Corollary 2.3, the higher the tax rate, the higher the cuto
productivity value (i.e., the value of V) one needs to be in order to remain in the formal
sector.
Cuto Productivity and Tax Revenue with Variable Commitment
Our second experiment is to determine how V and R are aected by varying the value
of , for a given tax rate. We follow the procedure of the last subsection, and we allow 
to move in the interval [0:01;0:99], xing the value of  at 0.25. Again, we perform 1,000
repetitions and obtain the average values for V and R. Figure 3 below shows the results.
PUT FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE
10In all of the simulations of subsections 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3, we choose parameter values  = 1=3 and
r = 0:06, and we also assume (i)  N(0;1). We allow for a population of 1,000 households. Our results are
qualititatively robust with respect to the changes in the number of households or the choice the parameters.
11Setting  to 0.75 is only for expositional purposes and does not qualititatively change the results. More
is presented in subsection 3.3.3.
7From Figure 3 we observe that the cuto productivity value decreases as  increases, as
suggested by Corollary 1. Moreover, tax revenue is positive and strictly increasing in 
provided that   0:5.
Cuto Productivity and Tax Revenue: The General Case
Finally, now we allow for both  and  to vary simultaneously to get a avor of the
characterization of the subgame-perfect equilibrium.
To keep the results manageable, we perform a simulation where we use a grid of step size
0.1, and we move  between 0.1 and 1.0, and  between 0.1 and 0.9.12 As was the case in
the previous subsections, we perform 1,000 repetitions and obtain the average values for V
and R0.
In order to fully characterize a result that is dependent both on the productivity parame-
ter V and on the tax announcement , we use the following simplication: The values of the
x-axis take the form x = 10+; in this way, a value of x of 4.6 has associated parameters
of  = 0:4 and  = 0:6. Figure 4 below shows the results of this procedure:
PUT FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE
On the other hand, in Figure 5, we change r to 0.02. From the gures it is clear that cuto
productivity for being formal has a positive relationship with  and a negative relationship
with , as expected by Corollary 2.3.
PUT FIGURE 5 ABOUT HERE
Endogeneous Taxes
Now we look at the numerical characterization of the subgame-perfect equilibrium where
the government chooses the optimal tax rate on the formal sector to maximize its revenue.
Our ultimate purpose here is to get comparative statics results of all the relevant variables
including , with respect to . For this subsection we use  = 0:4 at and r = 0:07.13 We
also assume (i)  N(0;1) and allow for a population of 1,000 households.
PUT FIGURE 6 ABOUT HERE
Figure 6 presents the behavior of the optimal tax rate  obtained from the government's
problem with respect to . The main result is that higher public trust allows for a government
to charge a higher tax rate on the formal sector.
PUT FIGURE 7 ABOUT HERE
12We make the decision to truncate the value of  at 0.9 for two reasons. First, as suggested by Figure 3,
values of  greater than a threshhold are not relevant in terms of revenue maximization for the government.
Second, as  ! 1, the cuto productivity value increases exponentially; this complicates the interpretation
of the results.
13The parameter values we used in the previous subsections were chosen somewhat arbitrarily. However,
one ultimate purpose of this subsection is to compare the model simulations against the data. Therefore, as
the next section will document the average risk premium in the data is 0:07. Moreover, we chose  to bring
the model to the data as close as possible.
8On the other hand, Figure 7 shows that the informal sector size is a decreasing function
of . Notice that Figure 3 draws a similar relationship. However, as opposed to Figure
3, in Figure 7 with increasing , not only informal sector size decreases but also we have
an increasing level of . In other words, increasing public trust increases the tax rate but
reduces the informal sector size at the same time.
PUT FIGURE 8 ABOUT HERE
Finally, in Figure 8 we compare the model simulation against its data counterpart. Specif-




V (i) YF(i)f(i)di, on the optimal tax rate given by the model. This is the line denoted by
"model". To compare it against the data, Figure 8 also plots informal sector size in the data
against the tax burden, along with the simple linear regression line obtained using these
variables in the data. Our choice of  = 0:4 becomes now clear as we have chosen it's value
to make the model generated regression line as close as possible to it's data counterpart. In
summary, we can say that the model is successful in accounting for the negative cross-country
correlation between taxes and the size of the informal economy.
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
Data
Dierent methodologies have been proposed in the literature to estimate the size of the
informal economy for a given economy. Even though these estimations are imperfect by their
nature,14 they are safely used for empirical cross-country analysis. In the empirical analysis,
we obtain our informal sector size estimates from the widely used estimates of Schneider et
al. (2010).
As a measure for taxes, in the reported results we use the tax burden data, dened as
the ratio of the tax revenue to GDP, from Government Finance Statistics. 15
In the regression analysis we use several variables to proxy  in the model. These are
the the government stability, rule of law, internal conict, investment prole and democratic
accountability indices obtained from Political Risk Services (ICRG). 16
Moreover, we also use two other control variables such as GDP per-capita and risk spread.
We got the data for GDP per-capita from the Groningen Economic Growth and Develop-
ment Center and the risk premium both from Moody's and Aswath Damodaran's website at
http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~adamodar/.
14We refer the readers to Schneider (2007) for a discussion of various methods used to estimate the size of
the informal sector.
15Several other tax indicators, tax rate on income, prots and capital gains from the World Development
Indicators or the scal freedom index from the Heritage Foundation have also been examined and results
do not depend on the choice of the tax measure or whether we use tax burden our ocial tax rates for
our analysis.Regression results using statutory taxes rather than taxes burden are available upon request.
Moreover, also see Elgin (2010) for a discussion of the choice of the relevant tax indicator in this context.
16In the regressions we included these variables in one composite index named public trust dened as the
sum the ve variables divided by the sum of the maximum values these variables might take. This ensures
that the index we have is between 0 and 1, similar to  we use in the model as it's counterpart.
9PUT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE
Summary statistics of all variables are provided in Table 1. In total, our data is an
unbalanced panel with 132 countries and a time horizon of 9 years, from 1999 to 2007.
Estimation and Results
The dynamic panel equation we estimate will be of the following form:
ISi;t = 0 + 1ISi;t 1 + 2taxi;t + 3trusti;t +
n X
k=3
kXki;t + i + t + i;t
where Xki;t are the other explanatory variables in addition to lagged informal sector size,
tax burden and public trust. i and t are the country and period xed eects, respectively.
Moreover ISi;t is the size of the informal sector relative to GDP, ISi;t 1 is its lagged value
and taxi;t is the tax burden.
PUT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE
Basically, we run two sets of regressions. In the three columns of the Table 2 (denoted
by FE), we report the results of the xed-eect linear panel regressions with AR (1) distur-
bances.17 In the last three columns (denoted by GMM) we repeat the same analysis using
the generalized method of moments estimator (GMM)  a la Arellano and Bond (1991). Here
we also use one-period lagged value of the independent variables as a dependent variable.
As one can observe from Table 2, if the public trust variable is not added to the regression,
the coecient of the tax rate is negative. However, once the public trust index is controlled
for, the coecient of the tax rate changes its sign and becomes positive. Even after GDP per-
capita and risk premium are added to the regression analysis, the sign of the tax coecient
remains positive This result is in line with our model where for xed values of  (or once
higher taxes imply a larger informal sector.
PUT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE
Finally, it will also be of interest to estimate simultaneous systems of equations, as this
allows us to evaluate the eect of the public trust on taxes jointly with the eects of public
trust, taxes, and other relevant variables on the informal sector size. We conduct a systems
estimation using three dierent estimators: three-stage least squares (3SLSL), ordinary least-
squared (OLS), and nally GMM. As the estimation results in Table 3 conrm, the empirical
analysis supports our theory. Specically, a higher level of public trust is associated with
higher taxes. And once public trust is controlled for, higher taxes are associated with a
larger informal sector. Moreover, higher public trust, lower risk premium and a higher level
of national income are all associated with a smaller informal economy.
CONCLUDING REMARKS AND DISCUSSION
17Hausman test points us in favor of a xed - eect regression and Wooldridge test rejects absence of
autocorrelation.
10In this paper we have developed a model to account for the surprising negative relationship
between the tax burden and the size of the informal economy. Specically, using a simple
model of optimal taxation we endogenize the determination of taxes and introduce a friction
to the model by allowing producers not fully trust in the government that it will actually
impose the announced tax rate. In equilibrium, if producers' trust in the government is
lower (higher), the government announces a lower (higher) tax rate on the formal sector; but
more (less) producers chose to stay in the informal economy. The idea here is that, once tax
authorities internalize the response of agents when setting tax policy, governments that lack
credibility may face very steeply decreasing returns to raising taxes and consequently opt for
lower tax rates. Since governments with less credibility are more likely to mistreat formal
producers ex-post, those economies will also tend to have smaller formal sectors. Finally,
using dynamic panel estimation techniques we present empirical evidence that our theory is
consistent with the data.
Our model can be extended by endogenizing the varying degree of commitment retained
by governments. This can be done in a political economy model of optimal taxation.
11References
[1] Amaral, P. and Quintin, E. (2006). A Competitive Model of the Informal Sector. Journal
of Monetary Economics 53 (7): 1541-53.
[2] Aruoba, S.B., 2010. Informal Sector, Government Policy and Institutions. University of
Maryland Working Paper.
[3] Arellano, M. and Bond, S. (1991). Some Test of Specication for Panel Data: Monte
Carlo Evidence and Application to Employment Equations. Review of Economic Studies
58: 277{297.
[4] Busato, F. and Chiarini, B. (2004). Market and Underground Activities in a Two-Sector
Dynamic Equilibrium Model. Economic Theory 23: 831-861.
[5] Cowell, F. A. (1985). The Economic Analysis of Tax Evasion. Bulletin of Economic
Research 37:3, 163-193.
[6] Davis, S. J. and Henrekson, M. (2004). Tax Eects on Work Activity, Industry Mix and
Shadow Economy Size: Evidence from Rich-Country Comparisons, NBER Working
Papers 10509.
[7] Delipalla, S. (2009). Commodity Tax Structure and Informal Activity. Bulletin of Eco-
nomic Research 61:3, 283-294.
[8] Elgin, C. (2010). Political Turnover, Taxes, and the Shadow Economy, Bogazici Univer-
sity Department of Economics Working Papers 2010/08.
[9] Fortin, B., Marceau, N. and Savard, L. (1997). Taxation, Wage Controls and the Infor-
mal Sector. Journal of Public Economics 66: 239-312.
[10] Frey, B. S., and Pommerehne, W. W. (1984). `The Hidden Economy: State and Prospect
for Measurement, Review of Income and Wealth 30: 1-23.
[11] Friedman, E., Johnson, S., Kaufman, D. and Zoldo-Lobaton, P. (2000). Dodging the
Grabbing Hand: The Determinants of Unocial Activity in 69 Countries, Journal of
Public Economics 76 (3): 459-493.
[12] Hall, R.E. and Jones, C. I. (1999). Why Do some Countries Produce so Much More
Output Per Worker Than Others? Quarterly Journal of Economics, 114: 83|116.
[13] Hatipoglu, O. and Ozbek, G. (2011). On the Political Economy of the Informal Sector
and Income Redistribution, European Journal of Law and Economics, 32 (1), 69-87.
[14] Ihrig, J. and Moe, K. S. (2004). Lurking in the Shadows: The Informal Sector and
Government Policy, Journal of Development Economics, vol. 73 (2): 541-557.
[15] Johnson, S., Kaufman, D. and Shleifer, A. (1997). The Unocial Economy in Transition.
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity: 159-221.
12[16] Johnson, S., Kaufman, D. and Zoido-Lobaton, P. (1998). Regulatory Discretion and the
Unocial Economy. The American Economic Review 88: 387-392.
[17] LaPorta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R. (1999). The Quality of
Government, Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, 15: 222|279.
[18] Lederman, D., Loayza, N. and Soares, R. R. (2005). Accountability and Corruption:
Political Institutions Matter, Economics and Politics, 17 (3): 1-35.
[19] Loayza, N. V. (1996). The Economics of the Informal Sector: A Simple Model and
Some Empirical Evidence from Latin America. Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series
on Public Policy 45: 129-162.
[20] Rauch, J.E. (1991). Modeling the Informal Sector Formally. Journal of Development
Economics, 35: 33-48.
[21] Schneider, F. (1994). Measuring the Size and Development of the Shadow Economy:
Can the Causes be Found and the Obstacles be Overcome?, in Hermann Brandstaetter
and Werner Goth, eds. Essays on Economic Psychology, Berlin: Springer, 193-212.
[22] Schneider, F. (1997). The Shadow Economies of Western Europe, Economic Aairs, 17:
3, 42-48.
[23] Schneider, F. (2007). Shadow Economies and Corruption All Over the World: New
Estimates for 145 Countries. Economics-The Open-Access, Open-Assessment E-Journal,
1(9): 1-66.
[24] Schneider, F., Buehn, A. and Montenegro, C.E. (2010). Shadow Economies all over
the World: New Estimates for 162 Countries from 1999 to 2007. World Bank Policy
Research Working Paper Series 5356.
[25] Tanzi, V., 1999. Uses and Abuses of Estimates of the Underground Economy, Economic
Journal, 109: F338-F347.
[26] Torgler, B. and Schneider, F. (2007). Shadow Economy, Tax Morale, Governance and
Institutional Quality: A Panel Analysis, IZA Discussion Papers, 2563.
1 Figures and Tables





















































































Tax revenue Cutoff productivity
 


















































Tax revenue Cutoff productivity
 













































Tax revenue Cutoff productivity
 


















































Tax revenue Cutoff productivity
 






















































Tax revenue Cutoff productivity
 

























































Tax revenue Cutoff productivity
 






















































Tax revenue Cutoff productivity
 

























































Tax revenue Cutoff productivity
 






































































































































































17Table 1: Summary Statistics
Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum
Tax Burden (in %) 29.30 13.43 0.10 67.48
Informal Sector Size (in %) 34.40 13.46 8.60 68.35
Political Stability 9.17 0.99 6.82 11.36
Rule of Law 3.86 1.30 1.00 6.00
Investment Prole 8.69 2.01 2.62 11.72
Democratic Accountability 4.02 1.59 0.15 6
Internal Conict 9.77 1.48 4.54 11.99
Risk Premium 0.07 0.08 0.04 0.5
GDP per-capita(in thousand GK$) 13.37 9.63 1.20 36.20
These are cross-section summary statistics of the panel averages.
Table 2: Informal Sector and Tax Burden
Dependent variable: IS
FE FE FE GMM GMM GMM
IS(-1) 0.82*** 0.59*** 0.62***
(0.12) (0.16) (0.15)
Tax -0.02** 0.02*** 0.01*** -0.01** 0.02*** 0.002***
(0.01) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006)
Public Trust -0.006** -0.006** -0.009** -0.002**
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.001)
Risk Premium (r) 0.009** 0.007*
(0.004) (0.004)
GDP per-capita -0.01** -0.005***
(0.005) (0.002)
R-squared 0.09 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99
Observations 883 767 766 883 767 766
Hansen J-Test 0.001 0.001 0.001
All panel regressions include year and country xed eects. Robust standard errors are reported in
parentheses. All variables except the informal sector size are in natural logarithms. ***, **, * denote 1, 5,
and 10% condence levels, respectively.
18Table 3: Systems Estimations
3SLS OLS GMM
Dependent Variable IS Tax IS Tax IS Tax
IS(-1) 0.51*** 0.60*** 0.62***
(0.20) (0.15) (0.15)
Tax Burden 0.02** 0.01*** 0.02**
(0.01) (0.005) (0.01)
Public Trust -0.004** 0.68*** -0.006*** 0.67*** -0.004** 0.66***
(0.002) (0.20) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.19)
Risk Premium (r) 0.008** 0.009** 0.007*
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
GDP per-capita -0.007** -0.01** -0.009**
(0.003) (0.005) (0.004)
R-squared 0.99 0.08 0.99 0.08 0.99 0.08
Observations 766 766 766 766 766 766
All variables except the informal sector size are in natural logarithms. All panel regressions include year and
country xed eects. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, * denote 1, 5, and 10%
condence levels, respectively.
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